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From the Editor:
''Natural Inquiry and ''the Miraculous''

A colleague recently gave me a copy of Theodore Roszak's "In Search of the
Miraculous," an article I had missed when it was reprinted in Harper's of January
1981. Because it led me to a revitalized view of those methods and practices this
journal subsumes under the term "natural inquiry," I'd like to summarize Roszak's
essay and discuss the parallels I find with naturalistic research.
The driving intellectual force of Western society for the last three centuries
has been, for Roszak, the establishment of a science-based reality principle which
now reigns supreme: skeptical, empirical, and demonstrable. But it is the
principle of the austere high ground, and it looks down on the plains of a culture
which is still "deeply entangled with piety, mystery, miracle, the search for
personal salvation." In the popular culture, this search is manifested by a growing
interest in such phenomena as UFOs, reincarnation, ESP, and the various cults; among
the academic elite, it underlies current enthusiasms for Zen, Kundalini yoga, the
noetic sciences, transpersonal/humanistic psychology, and parapsychology. All of
these interests and enthusiasms constitute, for Roszak, an attempt to solve the
problem of alienation and spiritual crisis endemic in the 20th century, an attempt
which shows "a restless spiritual need," a "hunger for wonders," for the miraculous.
One can explain this need in negative terms, that it is a symptom of human
weakness that has yet to be outgrown, but Roszak prefers a second expl anation: that
there is, in the human organism, a constant and enduring need for the transcendent
which cannot be denied .
There is, then, a secret psychological war between what he defines as the
secular humanistic intellect and the human need for transcendence . This war he
finds explicitly portrayed in the work of the romantic poet William Blake, whose
mythic figure Urizen (Your Reason) turns against the s ensuous and visionary elements
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of the human psyche , enforcing the claims of a ''single vision" and cruelly censoring
human experience to a reductionistic objectivity. This battle between single vision
and spiritual need occurs, for Roszak, over "the place of experience in the life of
the mind."
This is, in brief, his thesis, and he is obviously speaking of a multi-faceted
phenOL1ena which exists both on a large scale and with tremendous variety. I will
not be suggesting here that a particular method of educational inquiry will heal the
cultural dichotomy he has identified, but I do believe that the methods and products
of natural inquiry are directly related to his concerns about the place of
experience in the life of the mind.
Roszak does not attempt a solution to the problem, but he does identify three
key elements that could resolve the split between experience and mind: (1) keeping
personal experience at the center of one's discussion, (2) using ''deep
introspection" as a tool of inquiry, (3) in order to arrive at a transcendent
knowledge . I believe that each of these three elements relate directly to the
practice and products of natural inquiry considered in its highest potentiality.
"Where do we turn," Roszak asks, "to find the experience ... on which the books
and reports must finally be based '! " The answer, in this context, is obvious. When
we speak of the importance of living in the life being studied, of immersion, of a
naturalistic methodology, we are close to what Roszak defines as experience:
"immediate contact, direct impact, knowledge at its most personal level as it is
lived." People who are directly and deeply involved in natural inquiry have found
that source of lived experience in the actual children or teachers or classrooms in
which they live and think.
Many readers of this essay are familiar with the slighting or patronizing way
in which experiential research may be regarded. Its raethods are seen as
time-consuming, its short-range results as tainted with subjectivity, and its
long-term results as limited. "Lived knowledge" can be seen as just a catch-phrase
by those who live by catch-phrases, and disregarded as a suspect fad. This type of
knowledge, however, is our strength, the focus of our inquiry that assures us of
reality. This immediate contact with life-as-it-is-lived is the foundation of our
work.
Not only are we privileged to begin with human experience for the subject of
our t!.0ught, but we are reassured by its continuing existence . After all our words,
we have not exhausted or drained it, nor have we substituted a set of words or
figures for that reality. Other types of research present us with--to take the
National Assessment of Educational Progress as only an example--an elusive set of
13-year-olds across the nation who cannot organize their thoughts in an essay, a
group that can be dealt with only symbolically, at one remove, since we cannot
approach or touch them as actual 13-year-olds. In a naturalistic paradigm, the
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objects and subjects of our speculation remain in reality, as solid after our
research as before. The child writes another story the next day; the teacher comes
up the sidewalk of the school on Monday; the system of the school begins again as
someone makes coffee in the teachers' lounge. The natural inquirer is assured of
dealing with reality, with experience, and is always brought to realize the
continuing existence of that experience.
The method of "deep introspection" admired by Roszak suggests a second
connection with natural inquiry. Other research paradigms may begin with "thought"
and seem to require thought, or at least speculation, about the final results, but
natural inquiry demands thought before, after, and during the research. Its primary
tool is the reflective thought of the researcher, or of groups of joint-researcher8,
a type of deep thinking which endeavors to understand rather than merely explain.
This kind of thinking is not some instrument remote from humau experience; it is a
primary tool embedded in our experience. Through the deep introspection of joint or
individual criticism, analysis, description, and reflection, we seek, find, and deal
with our discoveries.
Roszak suggests that the important discoveries are a type of transcendent
knowledge, an arrival at a place of ''redeeming silence where the mysteries hold
sway" which will thus connect human experience to spiritual need. This third point
is the most troublesome part of my comparison between Roszak's essay and the
paradigm of natural inquiry, but it is also the most important. Why, of course,
would one want to undertake a knowledge-seeking inquiry which will result in mystery
and silenc~And what could possibly be "redeeming" about such apparently ethereal
results? Roszak's language is so fraught with such words--extraordinary,
mirac~lous, transcendent--that the reader is granted the right to be suspicious or
even alarmed. Yet I believe that the sense of these words can be applied to the
results of natural inquiry.
Let me use "transcendent knowledge'' as my phrase for this quality, and let me
acknowledge that "transcendent" carries a variety of meanings in philosophical
discourse including a minimalization or de-emphasis of direct experience. I use the
word in what I consider to be its purest etymological sense: a knowledge arrived at
by the process of climbing over or across and thus a process which involves what it
is one climbs over or across, a reaching toward some summit that includes the
activity of climbing the hill itself. This type of transcendence, in other words,
occurs through interaction with experience. It is the transcendence of a Walt
Whitman, a knowledge gained through enumeration and detail, dependent on that
material, rather than an airy leap into pre-existing transcendent abstraction.
There are two ways in which we experience this quality of transcendent
knowledge in the results of natural inquiry, one having to do with the results of a
study, what we have discovered, and the second having to do with what is left after
the study, what we have not discovered completely. First, the results or
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conclusions of a natural inquiry study, gained through reflection and introspection
on direct experience, are mysterious and transcendent because they point toward
greater and greater interaction between the various parts. Such conclusions do not
result in the identification of one discrete element in a system or room or child
that is responsible for the whole or which needs remediation in isolation. Such
conclusions necessarily point to the mysteriously complex ecology of human
experience and life, and a sense of the e x istence of this ecology is a type of
transcendent knowledge in the way I am using this phrase.
Secondly, what we are left with afterwards, and after words, is likewise
mysterious and transcendent: we have both the realization that we have tapped into
some vital force and the realization that we cannot articulate it completely. Hence
there must be an element of post-research "silence," of being "mute" (from which
"mystery" derives its stem), of a thrilling incompleteness. This is not, let me
point 0ut, the incompleteness of quantitative research which all will recognize:
that there is always more to discover, another study that can be done. Having
quantitatively discovered one thing and waiting for further research to produce
another thing is far different from the incompleteness of natural inquiry, a
recognition that we have touched the one thing of human experience and expression in
its entirety through the study of a single individual or relationship of
individuals:
the unified transcendent mystery that is life.
Along with the silence that occurs when we have touched the whole and not
encompassed it, another silence is introduced by what I have mentioned earlier, the
enduring existence of the subjects of our speculation. This is the mysterious
continuing-to-exist quality of a painting after the tour-guide or art-historian has
finished speaking.
It is the continuation of the pine trees around the lake shore
after we have had a surfeit of beauty in our own minds and bodies, and turn to go
indoors at ni g ht.
It is the mysterious continuing of Kevin or Amy bouncing into a
classroom on Monday morning after we have completed our thoughts on their
interactions last week. They have not been symbolized out of existence or
re-represented by some abstract measurement. They are here, again, always, alive.
These then are the advantages of being involved in natural inquiry. Our
observations and interviews and descriptions cannot become "more remote from the
senses, the lived life," as Roszak points out the tools of contemporary science have
become; they are, by their nature, grounded in the experience they deal with. They
are also connected inextricably to a type of transcendent knowledge, and all of this
is "redeeming" in a very real sense of the word. Through the processes of natural
inquiry we recover ownership of human life, both setting it free and reclaiming it
for ourselves. By discovering and affirming the greater organic complexities of
human ~xperience and expression, we have discovered and affirmed our own.
Because
experience and thought have been held together, interacting in the process of
inquiry, our own thoughts and experience are simultaneously enriched; touching our
subjects, we are touched ourselves.
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I have worried, at times, about the use of the adjective "natural'' to modify
"inqu~cy'' as my general phrase for a nu mber of related research-endeavor, but I
tl1ink the word is appropriate. We experience the naturalness of our subject, lived
experience and expression; the naturalness of our methodology, deep human reflection
on the phenomena of life; and the naturalness of our conclusions, a glimpse into
that mysterious place where, to use Blake ' s categories, the reasoning, the sensuous,
the compassionate, and the visionary powers merge with each other to form that
transcendent ecology which is human experience.
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